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Abstract: 
 
One of the most crucial lessons to be taken from the literature on electoral business cycles is that the short-
run electorally-induced fluctuations prejudice the long-run welfare. Since the very first studies on the matter, 
some authors offered suggestions as to what should be done against this electorally-induced instability. The 
problem assumes an interesting form, given that we can presume that if electoral business cycles do exist it 
is because voters, being ignorant, allow them to exist or, indeed, because the government, in the case of 
implementing policies that are optimal in the long-run for society, may be electorally punished by voters. As 
the government’s optimal policies depend crucially on the behaviour of voters, the paper analyses the 
circumstances under which a non-representative behaviour of voters may induce the government to behave 
as representative of the society’s interests (without punishing it). 
As is well-known, governments may have the temptation to exploit the Phillips curve. This discretionary way 
of making economic policy generates an inflation bias. The literature has then evolved to analyse possible 
punishment strategies in order to avoid that discretionary behaviour. Traditionally it is considered that the 
punishment takes the form of people considering announced policies as non-credible. This introduces 
the problem of arranging the right mechanism or moment in time to implement these punishment strategies. 
It turns out that elections are indeed the appropriate mechanism to punish or to reward the past behaviour 
of the incumbent. In fact, elections can be used to turn voters, i.e. the public into the principal who has all 
the incentives to motivate the government, as the agent, to use the appropriate policies. 
The paper analyses the circumstances under which an optimal contract can be established between the 
electorate and the government in order to guarantee that the government behaves in accordance with the 
true interests of the society. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The existence of democratic elections is often associated with the question of an electoral
cycle created by governments. From the literature on this kind of business cycles, one of
the most crucial lessons to be taken is that the short-run electorally-induced ﬂuctuations
prejudice the long-run welfare.
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Since the very ﬁrst studies on the matter, some authors
oﬀered suggestions as to what should be done against this electorally-induced instability.
For some authors, ever since Nordhaus (1975), a good alternative to the obvious proposal
to increase the electoral period length is to consider that voters abandon a passive and
naive behaviour and, instead, are willing to learn about government’s intentions.
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In fact,
because the electoral results depend on voters’ evaluation, we can presume that if electoral
business cycles do exist it is because voters, through ignorance or for some other reason,
allow them to exist or, indeed, because a benevolent government, i.e. the one implementing
policies that are optimal from the society’s point of view, may be electorally punished by
voters. This being said, the introductory objective of the paper is to show that it is the lack
of foresight of voters that may allow or, indeed, provoke the existence of electorally-induced
policies.
Being apparent that the government’s optimal policies depend crucially on the behav-
iour of voters on the election day, one should then study the circumstances under which
voters oblige the government to choose policies that are optimal from the society’s point of
view (without punishing it). Strategic voting may, in fact, make the electorally-motivated
government choose socially-optimal economic policies. This can be done by strategically
changing the relative importance of objectives on the election day in order to motivate the
government to behave as a benevolent social planner. For that to happen, it is enough
that voting decisions do not reﬂect (in the correct way) the social importance of the eco-
nomic variables. In other words, voters can make the government obtain the long-run ﬁrst
best social optimum if the strategy of voting results in isovote curves with diﬀerent shapes
of the social indiﬀerence curves. The main objective of the paper is then to show how,
from the society’s point of view, a non-representative behaviour of voters may induce the
government to behave as a representative agent of the society’s interests.
As is well-known, governments may have the temptation, not necessarily as the result
of trying to obtain votes, to exploit the Phillips curve. This discretionary way of making
economic policy generates an inﬂation bias. The literature has then evolved to analyse
possible punishment strategies in order to avoid that wrong consequence of discretionary
behaviour. Traditionally it is considered that the punishment takes the form of people
withdrawing belief in the announced policies, i.e. considering these as non-credible. Yet
1
It is often claimed that electorally-induced ﬂuctuations are indeed harmful for the society. Sørensen
(1991) shows that this conjecture is not necessarily correct.
2
It is curious to note that even before the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1975), Barro (1973) already used
a principal-agent approach to analyse how re-election motives can be used to control politicians, therefore
avoiding over-spending.
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this requires that individuals coordinate their actions but, as pointed out by Minford
(1995), a mechanism allowing for that coordination of actions seems, at the ﬁrst sight, to
be inexistent. This introduces the problem of arranging the right mechanism or moment
in time to implement these punishment strategies. It turns out that elections are indeed
the appropriate mechanism to punish the past behaviour of the incumbent. But this, in
turn, rises the question: which kind of discretionary electoral punishment makes sense? A
subsidiary objective of the paper is to shed some light on the answer to this question.
Closely related with the previous question (and its answer) is the fact that elections can
be used to turn voters, i.e. the public into the principal who should have all the incentives
to motivate the government, as the agent, to use the appropriate policies. As it is apparent
that voters should have good reasons for motivating the government to act as a benevolent
social-planner, one should then study the circumstances under which an optimal contract
can be established between the public and the government in order to guarantee enough
motivation for the agent/government, to behave in accordance with the true interests of
the principal/public. The main objective of the paper is then concretised with the analysis
of when and how an optimal contract can be established between the government and the
electorate in order to induce the socially-optimal economic policies to be chosen by the
government.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the importance
of voters’ foresight in the inevitability of an opportunistic behaviour by the government.
Moreover, it shows how a non-representative electorate may induce an opportunistic gov-
ernment to behave as benevolent. This links to section 3, where an electoral punishment
is questioned. Section 4 then analyses the type of ‘contract’ that can be made in order
to make it possible that the government receives the more votes the more it behaves as
benevolent. Section 5 concludes and oﬀers some possible avenues for further research.
2 The Importance of Voters’ Foresight
Elections can be seen as one of the — if not the — oldest ways of delegating decision power.
Voters, through an electoral process, elect an agent who is supposed to take decisions, for
instance implementing economic policies, that are the best for society. These decisions are
supposed to be even better than those that would be taken by voters themselves. This
traditional vision derives from the consideration that the government should essentially
be an agent that can and should have a more distant time horizon than voters do. This
means that, when the electorate votes on a government which has implemented policies
that have generated pleasurable outcomes and this is viewed as a bad phenomenon, it is
because voters possess a shorter-sight view of the economy. In the limiting case, if voters
are viewed as agents with the same time horizon as the government, then a positive election
result should be viewed as exactly what the society wants, if we consider the electorate
as representative of society. In any case, the voters’ objective should be to make the
government choose policies that are optimal from the society’s point of view.
Strategic voting, ever since studied byMacRae (1977), may, in fact, make the electorally-
motivated government to choose socially-optimal economic policies. This can be done by
3
strategically changing the relative importance of objectives on the election day. A some-
how diﬀerent kind of strategic voting can also be applied to avoid bad consequences, in the
long-run, from the short-run behaviour of a government just wanting to win the forthcom-
ing election. To illustrate the analysis let us consider the following ﬁgure, as in Nordhaus
(1975):
3
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Figure 1: The long-run equilibria
Clearly, from the long-run point of view, the best situation is attained at point G.
Nevertheless, the repetition of short-run behaviour by the government leads the economy,
in the long-run, to point M which is obviously Pareto-inferior to point G.
4
What can then
be done to lead the economy to point G instead of point M? In other words, how can
voters motivate the government immediately to choose point G instead of point B (after
a starting position given by point A)? The answer is conceptually easy to give (and may
be generalised to other models unlike the Nordhaus (1975) one). For that to happen, it is
enough that voting decisions do not reﬂect (in the correct way) the social importance of
the economic variables.
5
This very simple case show that voters can indeed make the government obtain the
long-run ﬁrst best social optimum if they incentive/motivate the government to do so by
voting in a strategic way. The strategy of voting should then result in isovote curves with
diﬀerent shapes of the social indiﬀerence curves. In the particular case that we are using as
illustration, it is clear that voters should consider, for their voting decisions, unemployment
3
Note that as Nordhaus (1975) considers the “observed aggregate voting function (...) as the appropriate
social welfare function” the isovote curves coincide with the social indiﬀerence curves. In fact, the as-
sumption that the objective function reﬂects both the government’s and the society’s preferences has been
present in most of the relevant literature. See, for instance, Walsh (1995) or Svensson (1997). Clearly, we
will not adopt this point of view.
4
As a consequence, Nordhaus (1975) concludes that “democratic systems will choose a policy on the
long-run trade-oﬀ that has lower unemployment and higher inﬂation than is optimal.”
5
This fact makes it interesting to note how, in a dynamic sense, we are close enough to the remark
provided in Minford (1995), which says: “The ironic implication (...) is that the government should be
deterred from trying to maximise social welfare in order to succeed in maximising it”.
4
relatively more important than inﬂation, then society does. Figure 1 would then assume
the following aspect.
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Figure 2: A strategic change
3 Does Electoral Punishment Make Sense?
In the situation where there is absolutely no uncertainty then, in some sense, the strategic
voting as described above can be more safely or more fairly performed. To be clearer,
this is to say that, because there are no stochastic elements ‘contaminating’ the eﬀects of
economic policies on economic outcomes, punishing ‘wrong’ outcomes should be as easy
or as fair as punishing ‘wrong’ policies. Alternatively, the motivation needed to obtain
‘good’ outcomes may be as well be done at the economic policy level. Obviously, when the
results of the economic policies also depend upon the realisation of, say, stochastic shocks,
a sophisticated electorate may want to consider it safer or fairer to punish or monitor
policies rather than outcomes.
The existence of stochastic shocks also has another kind of important consequence on
the punishment strategies. As is well-known, governments may have the temptation, not
necessarily as the result of trying to obtain votes, to exploit the Phillips curve. This discre-
tionary way of making economic policy generates an (unnecessary) inﬂation bias but it also
reﬂects the optimal response to shocks. The literature has then evolved to analyse possi-
ble punishment strategies in order to avoid that maleﬁc part of discretionary behaviour.
Traditionally it is considered that the punishment takes the form of people considering
announced policies as non-credible. But this requires that individuals coordinate their
actions. As Minford (1995) clearly points out:
“It is only rational for people to follow these strategies if they know everyone
else will follow them; yet there is no mechanism to initiate common action in
following the strategies.”
This leaves us, then, with the problem of arranging the right mechanism or moment
in time to implement these punishment strategies. It turns out that elections are indeed
5
the appropriate mechanism to punish or to reward the past behaviour of the incumbent
government. In other words, elections can in fact turn voters into the principal who has all
the incentives to motivate the government, as the agent, to use the appropriate policies.
Naturally, one has then to determine the appropriate policies. In a situation where
there are some stochastic shocks, it is optimal to let the government react to those shocks.
But the allowance to use some discretion may not be used to try to exploit the Phillips
curve, as (even the government should know) this attempt only results in unnecessary
inﬂation. As Minford (1995) shows, there is the possibility of considering a discretionary
electoral punishment large enough (that is an electoral defeat) to deter any attempt to
exploit the Phillips curve, but no punishment at all for the correct response to shocks. But
this means that when monitoring the government’s performance, voters should be able to
observe (at least the sum of) the individual shocks by the time of the election. Let us then
proceed by showing how to overcome this diﬃculty. We start by presenting the model used
in Minford (1995).
3.1 The model
Concerning the supply side of the model, we admit that the output level, y
t
, deviates from
the natural level, y¯
t
, if there is an inﬂation surprise and some supply shock. This means
that we assume a Lucas supply curve as follows:
y
t
= y¯
t
+ α (π
t
− π
e
t
) + u
t
, (1)
where u
t
is a i.i.d. supply shock observed by the policy maker but not by the wage-setters,
with expected value E[u
t
] = 0 and variance V [u
t
] = σ
2
u
. Due to this speciﬁcation, there are
reasons justifying stabilisation policies, as the government may react to shocks whereas the
same does not happen with wage-setters. Following Minford (1995), we also assume that
the natural level follows a random walk:
y¯
t
= y¯
t−1
+ v
t
, (2)
where v
t
is a i.i.d. shock, independent of u
t
, with expected value E[v
t
] = 0 and variance
V [v
t
] = σ
2
v
.
Let us also assume that disutility in each period is a quadratic function of the deviations
of output levels, y
t
, and inﬂation, π
t
, from their desired values, y˜ and 0, respectively, where
y˜ > y¯
t
.
6
Assuming β to be the (relative) degree of inﬂation aversion, the vote function is
given by:
V = −
1
2
βπ
2
t
−
1
2
(y
t
− y˜)
2
. (3)
6
Note that it is considered a full-quadratic objective function, where the objective, in what concerns
output, is to stabilise it in turn of a given level, y˜, that exceeds the natural level y¯. This is justiﬁed by the
existence of market imperfections such as distorting taxes that make the natural level of output ineﬃciently
low. An alternative explanation is that labour market ‘insiders’ set wages too high for full employment.
See, for instance, Lockwood (1997), Persson and Tabellini (1999) or Svensson (1997).
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As the model is stochastic, we consider that the government follows a policy rule (a
state-contingent strategy), which is assumed to be linear in the realisation of the shocks:
7
π
t
= a
t
+ b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
. (4)
The optimal values of the coeﬃcients a
t
, b
t
and c
t
diﬀer according to the policy envi-
ronment. If the government commits itself to a choice of a
t
, b
t
and c
t
in advance, that is
before the private sector sets wages (or expected inﬂation) that corresponds to the so-called
commitment solution. The so-called discretionary solution corresponds to the case where
those parameters are determined after the setting of wages (or expected inﬂation). As
is well-known, in general, these two solutions diﬀer because, under discretion, the policy-
maker fails to internalise the mapping from actual policy (inﬂation) to expected policy
(inﬂation), which does not happen under commitment.
We ﬁrst determine the discretionary solution. As is well-known, in this case it is as-
sumed that for certain reason(s), including credibility ones, the government cannot commit
itself to a policy rule but chooses its policy under discretion. In this case, the optimal inﬂa-
tion rate will be chosen only after inﬂation expectations are formed (and the supply shock
is observed).
The equilibrium policy rule is determined as follows. We ﬁrst substitute (1), (2) and
(4) into (3) and get
V
D
= −
1
2
β (a
t
+ b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
)
2
−
1
2
(y¯
t−1
+ v
t
+ α (a
t
+ b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
− π
e
t
) + u
t
− y˜)
2
,
whose expected value is maximised at
a
t
= α
απ
e
t
+ y˜ − y¯
t−1
β + α
2
(5)
and
b
t
= c
t
= −
α
β + α
2
. (6)
Imposing rational expectations, i.e. π
e
t
= E [π
t
|u
t
, v
t
] = a
t
, the solution of (5) will be:
a
t
= α
y˜ − y¯
t−1
β
,
which means that the optimal policy under discretion is:
π
t
= α
y˜ − y¯
t−1
β
−
α
β + α
2
u
t
−
α
β + α
2
v
t
. (7)
A few results are already noticeable. Plainly, inﬂation is used to cushion supply shocks
in order to stabilise the eﬀects of these shocks on output. Negative supply shocks are
7
We assume that the government retains control of the monetary policy. See, for instance, Muscatelli
(1998). Alternatively, this may be seen as assuming that the government delegates the monetary policy in
a central banker but, from what follows, it will be clear that this does not correspond to a mere re-location
of the time-inconsistency problem. In fact, the way voters reward or punish the government may constitute
the (suﬃciently) high cost for changing the arrangement/contract (or simply to change the central banker)
allowing delegation to solve (and not simply re-locate) the time-inconsistency problem. See Driﬃll and
Rotondi (2003).
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counteracted with positive inﬂation surprises. Moreover, the higher the concern about
inﬂation relative to output stabilisation, that is β, the smaller is the degree to which
inﬂation is used to stabilise the eﬀects of supply shocks on output.
8
This optimal response
to shocks is, nevertheless, accompanied by an inﬂation bias as
π
e
t
= E [π
t
|u
t
, v
t
] = α
y˜ − y¯
t−1
β
.
The output level will be given by:
y
t
= y¯
t−1
+
β
β + α
2
(u
t
+ v
t
) . (8)
This policy (and the corresponding output) leads to
E
[
V
D
]
= −
1
2
[
β
β + α
2
σ
2
+
β + α
2
β
(y¯
t−1
− y˜)
2
]
,
where σ
2
≡ σ
2
u
+ σ
2
v
.
We now proceed by determining the commitment solution. As the private sector does
not observe u
t
and v
t
then, if the policy rule (4) is considered credible, expected inﬂation
should be set equal to:
π
e
t
= E [π
t
|u
t
, v
t
] = a
t
. (9)
If expectations are made according to (9), then
V
C
= −
1
2
β (a
t
+ b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
)
2
−
1
2
(y¯
t−1
+ v
t
+ α (b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
) + u
t
− y˜)
2
,
whose expected value is maximised at:
a
t
= 0 (10)
and
b
t
= c
t
= −
α
β + α
2
. (11)
Plainly, any inﬂation that occurs is fully unexpected and does not violate rationality,
as it happens only as the result of the fact that government knows the value of the shocks,
whereas private sector does not.
9
In fact, π
e
t
= 0.
A simple comparison between the discretionary and commitment solutions for inﬂation
— see (6) and (11) — shows that the optimal response to shocks is the same in both (discre-
tionary/commitment) situations. This fact is naturally important to explain the equality
registered by the level of output in both situations. See (8).
This policy (and the corresponding output) leads to
8
Plainly, this is accordance with the result that an augmented output variability, given by σ
2
y
=
β
2
(
β+α
2
)
2
(
σ
2
u
+ σ
2
v
)
is the price to pay when delegating the economic policy to a more conservative agent.
9
Note that a possible contradiction is to be present by assuming that voters are able to observe these
shocks.
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E[
V
C
]
= −
1
2
[
β
β + α
2
σ
2
+ (y¯
t−1
− y˜)
2
]
,
where σ
2
≡ σ
2
u
+ σ
2
v
.
Clearly, on average, the commitment solution gives rise to better results than the dis-
cretionary solution. In fact:
E
[
V
C
]
− E
[
V
D
]
=
1
2
[
α
2
β
(y¯
t−1
− y˜)
2
]
> 0.
Obviously, one should be able to make the government to choose the commitment
solution by imposing a punishment high enough to make the government to react only to
shocks, which can be done at the election day. This absolute need to react only to shocks
constitutes then a constraint in the government’s optimisation programme. This is so
because it is in the government’s own interest that the pre-commitment policy is shown to
be computed in that way. Only in that circumstances the pre-commitment policies will be
expected and eﬀectively chosen because they are optimal. In this way, the government, by
truly punishing itself if required to do so, will achieve a better outcome. See also Minford
(1990).
In the case of a discretionary electoral punishment, as it is considered in Minford (1995),
the government uses as a constraint:
π
t
= b
t
u
t
+ c
t
v
t
and, in this case, the expected value E
[
V
M
]
will be maximised at
b
t
= c
t
= −
α
β + α
2
.
Clearly, if the self-imposed punishment is considered credible, π
e
t
= 0. All this results
in:
E
[
V
M
]
= −
1
2
[
β
β + α
2
σ
2
+ (y¯
t−1
− y˜)
2
]
.
Given that voters have good reasons for motivating the incumbent government, is it
plausible to accept that, despite the initial problems of making the punishment promises
acquire credibility, these punishment strategies make sense? The inﬁnite repetition of the
gains from those strategies will plausibly overcome the costs but this is no less demanding
than making it credible the commitment solutions. It is apparent that the self-punishment
as above described suﬀers from a credibility problem which is aggravated by the fact that,
in order to be implementable, requires that voters observe the shocks u
t
, v
t
, or at least
u
t
+ v
t
.
It turns out that the intrinsic diﬀerence on the information set between voters and
the government can be handled through the consideration of an optimal contract that, in
this case, assumes that voters reward (or punish) the performance of the government, in
marginal terms, by a linear term in inﬂation. This, as it will be shown below, will make it
possible to motivate or indeed oblige an opportunistic government to behave as benevolent.
9
4 The Optimal Contracts
4.1 A one-period case
In the tradition of Walsh (1995) or Svensson (1997) we study a particular kind of contract,
i.e. a linear inﬂation contract, established between the government and the electorate,
whose objective is to make an electorally-motivated government to choose policies that are
socially-optimal. The objective of the contract is to eliminate the inﬂation bias. This is
so because the optimal response to shocks is the same whether policy is determined in a
discretionary way or using a commitment rule.
10
We consider that the electorate votes according to
V = −
1
2
βπ
2
t
−
1
2
(y
t
− y˜)
2
+ λπ
t
. (12)
If this is the case, the optimal discretionary policy will be given by
π
t
=
α
2
π
e
t
− αy¯
t−1
− αv
t
− αu
t
+ αy˜ + λ
β + α
2
.
The imposition of rational expectations leads to:
π
e
t
=
α (y˜ − y¯
t−1
) + λ
β
, (13)
which means
π
t
=
α (y˜ − y¯
t−1
) + λ
β
−
α
β + α
2
(u
t
+ v
t
) . (14)
This, in turn, leads to:
y
t
= (y¯
t−1
− y˜) +
α
β + α
2
(u
t
+ v
t
) .
The optimal contract should now be established by the determination of the optimal
value for the parameter λ. Naturally, from the voters’ viewpoint, λ should be the one
maximising the expected value of (12). From the ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂E [V ]
∂λ
=
α (y˜ − y¯
t−1
) + λ
β
!
= 0,
one immediately obtains that λ = α (y¯
t−1
− y˜). Clearly, the optimal value of λ is the one
making the expected value of inﬂation being zero; see (13). This naturally is compatible
with an optimal policy, determined in a full discretionary way, that reacts only to shocks;
see (14).
An optimal contract can, in fact, be determined as λ depends only on observables by
the voters. Given that the optimal contract is based solely on elements that voters know,
the fact that the government possesses private information about the values of the shocks
does not invalidate the contract. This is so because the penalty/reward being linear in
10
Given the close relation with this question, one should refer that indeed, in presence of preferences
uncertainty, in general there is no contract leading to the same welfare as the one associated with a com-
mitment rule. See Beetsma and Jensen (1998).
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inﬂation it (only) increases/decreases the marginal popularity cost of inﬂation by the same
amount for all states of nature, i.e. for all values of the shocks. Therefore the optimal
response to shocks is unaﬀected by the particular value of the shock that, indeed, only the
government observes.
The model considered so far is a one-period (time-less) model. In fact, it does not need
to be a multi-period model as, clearly, the government reacts exactly in the same way, in
any period. Given that the government reacts only to shocks, the optimal response (to
shocks) does not change over time. Hence, we cannot, with this model, study another case
of interest to us, where a diﬀerent weighting of time periods leads to economic policies
that do not maximise social welfare. We then move to consider another case where this
situation can be studied.
4.2 A two-period case
In order to study the case where society weights time in a diﬀerent way that the way
voters forget, we start by assuming that the government’s mandate can be divided in a
non-election period, where t = 1 ≡ N and in an election period, where t = 2 ≡ E, such
that society’s welfare during the mandate is given by:
W =W
N
+ ρW
E
, (15)
where ρ is the social rate of discount, whereas the vote function is
V = µV
N
+ V
E
, (16)
where µ is the degree of memory of the electorate. At this stage we also admit that
W
t
= V
t
= −
1
2
βπ
2
t
−
1
2
(y
t
− y˜)
2
. (17)
In these circumstances it is worth immediately noticing that, in general, excepting if
µρ = 1, the policies that maximise social welfare (15) are not the ones that maximise pop-
ularity (16) . As it plausible to assume that both ρ and µ do not exceed 1, it is immediately
clear that only in the case of perfect memory, i.e. µ = 1, and both periods being equally
important for society, i.e. ρ = 1, an opportunistic behaviour of the government is the
best one for society. In all the other cases, society suﬀers a loss in welfare due to the way
government explore the degree of memory loss by the electorate.
As above was pointed out, the model corresponding to the natural rate case, as the one
considered so far, does not imply a time-varying optimal response to shocks. If, indeed, for
some reason, the government reacts diﬀerently to shocks in diﬀerent moments of time then
a diﬀerent weighting of time may, as well, be a source of sub-optimal economic policies.
It turns out that, if output presents some degree of persistence over time, a time-varying
optimal response to shocks is obtained. Hence, we will consider next a version of the model
embodying output persistence; see Gärtner (1999) for an output persistence case and/or
Jonsson (1997) for an unemployment persistence case.
11
11
As acknowledged in Gärtner (1999), only quite recently authors have started to pay due attention to
11
Let us start to re-write the supply side of the model as follows:
y
t
= y¯ + α (π
t
− π
e
t
) + ε
t
, (18)
where ε
t
is a i.i.d. supply shock observed by the policy maker but not by the wage-setters,
with expected value E[ε
t
] = 0 and variance V [ε
t
] = σ
2
ε
.
As is clear, (18) does not allow for output persistence. Therefore, in order to introduce
this phenomenon, it will be replaced by
y
t
= α (π
t
− π
e
t
) + (1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
+ ε
t
, (19)
where y¯
t
≡ (1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
is the ‘equilibrium level of output’ in period t and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
measures the degree of output persistence.
12
To sum up, (19) shows that the output level
is aﬀected by an inﬂation surprise, by an inherited level of output and/or by some supply
shock.
13
We ﬁrst determine the commitment solution. The one-period objective function is (17)
such that
W = E [W
t
+ ρW
t+1
] , (20)
is the criterion to be optimised.
As before we consider a state-contingent rule for economic policy:
π
t
= a
t
+ b
t
ε
t
. (21)
If the policy rule (21) is considered credible, expected inﬂation should be set equal to
π
e
t
= E [π
t
|ε
t
] = a
t
. (22)
If expectations are made according to (22), and inﬂation follows (21), output will be
given by:
y
t
= (1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
+ (αb
t
+ 1) ε
t
. (23)
the consequences of considering that relevant macroeconomic variables, in reality, show some degree of
persistence over time. A casual observation on reality imediatly conﬁrms this fact.
On the theoretical ground, this phenomenon has been explained: (i) on the supply side of the labour
market, by (voluntary/involuntary) limited search for jobs activity; and (ii) on the demand side of the
labour market, as the result of a prolonged period of restrictive anti-inﬂationary policies that have been
followed by the generality of the European countries. Independently of the validity of these theoretical
explanations, the fact is that reality evidences this phenomenon and that, for our purposes, is suﬃcient to
justify the consideration that there is some degree of output persistence.
12
Obviously, to φ = 0 corresponds the natural-rate case that we have analysed so far. Clearly, a major
consequence of introducing persistence in output is that the optimisation problem becomes intrinsically
dynamic/intertemporal given that, when φ = 0, past inﬂationary surprises inﬂuence current output levels.
13
This way of introducing persistence, which results in expression (19) is the most common in the lit-
erature; see Gärtner (1999), Jonsson (1997) or Lockwood (1997). It is interesting to note that Svensson
(1997) justiﬁes the existence of an autoregressive term on the Phillips curve when wage setters set nominal
wages one period in advance, disregarding non-union workers’ preferences for real wages and employment,
and where union membership depends on previous unemployment. This explanation should therefore be
viewed as alternative to the one already given in Lucas (1973) for output persistence.
12
Plugging (21) and (23) into the loss function (17) we get
W
C
t
= −
1
2
β (a
t
+ b
t
ε
t
)
2
−
1
2
((1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
+ (αb
t
+ 1) ε
t
− y˜)
2
.
The optimal policy rule will be determined by solving
max
{a
t
,b
t
}
W = E [W
1
+ ρW
2
] . (24)
A backward-induction solution of (24) shows that:
14
a
C
2
= 0 and b
C
2
= −
α
β + α
2
.
This means that
π
C
2
= −
α
α
2
+ β
ε
2
(25)
which diﬀers from
π
e
2
≡ a
2
= 0
due to some random supply shock occurred on the second period.
Output will be
y
C
2
= (1− φ) y¯ + φy
1
+
β
α
2
+ β
ε
2
.
Given these results, one obtains next:
a
C
1
= 0
and
b
C
1
= −
α
(
1 + ρφ
2
)
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
, (26)
which means that
π
C
1
= −
α
(
1 + ρφ
2
)
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
ε
1
(27)
and that
y
C
1
= (1− φ) y¯ + φy
0
+
β
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
ε
1
. (28)
Through the comparison between the optimal inﬂation rates, it is apparent that, as a
shock occurring at the ﬁrst period carries over some eﬀect to the next period, it is optimal
to stabilise more at t = 1 than at t = 2.
15
This extra stabilisation ‘eﬀort’ is an increasing
14
The algebra is tedious but straightforward.
15
In fact,
∣
∣
b
C
1
∣
∣
−
∣
∣
b
C
2
∣
∣
=
αβρφ
2
(
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
)
(β + α
2
)
> 0.
13
function of the discount rate ρ, as well of the degree of output persistence φ; see (25) versus
(27).
16
We proceed by determining the discretionary solution which, immediately considers
the establishment of a contract that besides being linear in inﬂation it also will allow for a
diﬀerence between the degree of aversion of voters and than that of society.
As noted above, the timing of events suﬀers a change as, in this case, the optimal
inﬂation rate will be chosen only after inﬂation expectations are formed (and the supply
shock is observed). Hence, the equilibrium policy rule is determined as follows. We ﬁrst
substitute (21) into (19) and get
y
t
= α (a
t
+ b
t
ε
t
− π
e
t
) + (1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
+ ε
t
. (29)
Plugging (21) and (29) into the loss function (17) we get
V
D
t
= −
1
2
β
t
(a
t
+ b
t
ε
t
)
2
−
1
2
(α (a
t
+ b
t
ε
t
− π
e
t
) + (1− φ) y¯ + φy
t−1
+ ε
t
− y˜)
2
+ λ
t
π
t
.
Using a backward-induction method to:
17
max
{a
t
,b
t
}
V = E [µV
1
+ V
2
]
we ﬁrst obtain
b
2
= −
α
β
2
+ α
2
and
a
2
=
α
2
π
e
2
+ α (y˜ − y¯) + αφ (y¯ − y
1
) + λ
2
β
2
+ α
2
,
whose rational expectations solution is:
a
2
=
α (y˜ − y¯) + αφ (y¯ − y
1
) + λ
2
β
2
.
Plainly
π
D
2
=
α (y˜ − y¯) + αφ (y¯ − y
1
) + λ
2
β
2
−
α
β
2
+ α
2
ε
2
. (30)
To the optimal inﬂation rate π
D
2
will then correspond
y
D
2
= (1− φ) y¯ + φy
1
+
β
2
β
2
+ α
2
ε
2
. (31)
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In fact,
∂
∂ρ
(
αρφ
2
β
(
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
)
(β + α
2
)
)
=
αφ
2
β
(
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
)
2
> 0,
and
∂
∂φ
(
αρφ
2
β
(
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
)
(β + α
2
)
)
=
2αρφβ
(
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
)
2
> 0.
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The algebra is tremendously tedious but still straightforward.
14
Naturally, the objective of the contract is to make the electorate to vote in order to
make an opportunistic government to choose policies that are the ones that society would
consider the best ones. In other words, the objective is to determine the values of λ
1
and
λ
2
such that the inﬂation bias is eliminated while guaranteeing the optimal reaction to
shocks from the society’s point of view. For the last period of the mandate, this means:
λ
2
= α (y¯ − y˜) + αφ (y
1
− y¯)
and
β
2
= β.
This last equality shows that, being the last period of the mandate, the electorate
should be as conservative as society.
Concerning the ﬁrst period of the mandate, it is possible to verify that
a
1
=
α
2
(
µ+ φ
2
)
π
e
1
+ α (φ− 1)
(
φ
2
+ φ+ µ
)
y¯ + α (µ+ φ) y˜ − αφ
(
µ+ φ
2
)
y
0
+ µλ
1
µα
2
+ φ
2
α
2
+ µβ
1
,
whose rational expectations solution is:
a
1
=
α (φ− 1)
(
φ
2
+ φ+ µ
)
y¯ + α (µ+ φ) y˜ − αφ
(
µ+ φ
2
)
y
0
+ µλ
1
µβ
1
.
Given the objectives of the contract, the parameter λ
1
will be determined in order to
make expected inﬂation, π
e
1
= a
1
being zero, which means:
λ
1
= α
(µ+ φ) (y¯ − y˜) + φ
(
µ+ φ
2
)
(y
0
− y¯)
µ
.
Concerning the parameter b
1
in the policy rule it is possible to show that:
b
1
= −
α
(
φ
2
+ µ
)
µα
2
+ φ
2
α
2
+ µβ
1
. (32)
In order to guarantee the same response to shocks as in the benevolent government
case, the degree of inﬂation aversion by the electorate for the ﬁrst period, β
1
, must satisfy
the following equation that results from (32) being equalised to (26):
−
α
(
φ
2
+ µ
)
µα
2
+ φ
2
α
2
+ µβ
1
= −
α
(
1 + ρφ
2
)
β + α
2
+ ρφ
2
α
2
.
The result is:
β
1
= β
µ+ φ
2
µ+ µρφ
2
,
which shows that in the ﬁrst period of the mandate the electorate should be more conserv-
ative than society itself. This is so in order to soften more the eﬀect of the shock occurring
at the ﬁrst period which is propagated to the second period given that output shows some
persistence.
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5 Conclusion and Discussion
The social perception that an electoral cycle is a costly phenomenon anticipates a possible
remedy. A naive approach would consider the only way of turning a self-interested vote-
maximising government into an ‘altruistic’ government which optimises a social welfare
function — the benevolent dictator ﬁction — is by imposing an inﬁnite electoral period.
Nevertheless, this trivial solution can be disputed even in economic terms. Even if non-
economic aspects are ignored, that is if we abstract from valid objectives inherent in the
democratic process such as political freedom, the consideration of an entirely economic
objective function still does not lead to an obvious answer to the question: is democracy
bad for the economy?
On the one hand, there are at least three reasons why elections may also have economic
beneﬁts — the non-economic beneﬁts are obvious. The ﬁrst reason is based on an argument
for eﬃciency arising from the nature of elections as devices for distinguishing between
competent and incompetent policy-makers. In a sense related with that reason, in the
second place, elections can also be the appropriate mechanism to punish (or to reward)
the incumbent government if it tried (or not) to exploit the Phillips curve throughout the
mandate. In the third place, elections can serve the purpose of signalling social preferences
which naturally evolve over time. In other words, the existence of elections is obviously
crucial for taking into consideration the preferences of new generations.
On the other hand, the instability created by electorally-motivated governments is,
indeed, accepted to be long term welfare-decreasing. There are, at least, three reasons why
the electorally-induced economic policies may be prejudicial to social welfare:
1. The opportunistic government uses a ﬁnite time horizon, usually the election day,
whereas society should consider an inﬁnite time horizon;
2. The discounting of time periods is diﬀerent: whereas, for society, future periods
should be less important than present ones, this is not the case with an opportunistic
government, as future moments, i.e. those closer to the election day, are more vital
than present ones, in order to explore the decay in the memory of voters;
3. The vote function may not reﬂect exactly the (relative) social preferences.
The paper has shown that, in fact, when the vote function does not reﬂect, in the
correct way, the social preferences it is possible to eliminate (besides, obviously, this third
reason) also the problem of a diﬀerent valuation of time as indicated in the second reason.
18
Moreover, it has also shown how this non-representative behaviour of voters, which is
established at an optimal ‘contract’ level, may eliminate the inﬂation bias arising from a
discretionary behaviour of the government without the need of an electoral punishment à
la Minford. In what concerns the ﬁrst reason, we would like to leave it as an opportunity
for future research.
18
As an evidence of how this problem has been ignored by the literature, consider, for example, Fratianni
et al. (1997) where discounting is ignored for parsimony and Lohmann (1998) where it is assumed that
second-period utilities (in a two-period model) are not discounted.
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From what we have just discussed, it is apparent that the government’s optimal strategy
depends crucially on the (possibility) of punishment imposed by voters on the election day.
The punishment imposed by voters can, in fact, assume diﬀerent forms and may as well
be transformed in reward, i.e on motivation such that the government, as an agent, puts
all eﬀort, during the mandate in order to obtain the best result from the society’s, as the
principal, point of view. In the paper we followed a traditional approach, as in most of
the literature, that is an optimal contract that does nor explicitly contemplates the eﬀort
made by the agent which, by the optimal nature of the contract, is also the best one from
the principal’s point of view. This was, indeed, the initial framework of the principal-agent
models. See, for instance, Frey (1983), Sutter (1998) and/or Walsh (1995). The application
of this approach seems to be an avenue for further research that we would like to carry out
in the ﬁeld of the relations between economic policies and elections.
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